Sellars' Argument for an Ontology of Absolute Processes by Landy, David
Journal for the History of
Analytical Philosophy
Volume 7, Number 1
Editor in Chief
Marcus Rossberg, University of Connecticut
Editorial Board
Annalisa Coliva, UC Irvine
Henry Jackman, York University
Kevin C. Klement, University of Massachusetts
Consuelo Preti, The College of New Jersey
Anthony Skelton, Western University
Mark Textor, King’s College London
Audrey Yap, University of Victoria
Richard Zach, University of Calgary
Editor for Special Issues
Sandra Lapointe, McMaster University
Review Editors
Sean Morris, Metropolitan State University of Denver
Sanford Shieh, Wesleyan University
Design and Layout
Daniel Harris, Hunter College
Kevin C. Klement, University of Massachusetts
ISSN: 2159-0303
jhaponline.org
© 2019 David Landy
Sellars’s Argument for an Ontology of Absolute
Processes
David Landy
Scholars have rejectedWilfrid Sellars’s argument for an ontology
of absolute processes on the grounds that it relies on a dubious
and dogmatic appeal to the homogeneity of color. Borrowing
from Rosenthal’s recent defense, but ultimate rejection of homo-
geneity, I defend this claimon Sellarsian/Kantian transcendental
grounds, and reconstruct the remainder of his argument. I argue
that Sellars has good reason to suppose that homogeneity is a
necessary condition of any possible experience, including indi-
rect experience of theoretical-explanatory posits, and therefore
good reason to hold that Reductive Materialism, as he conceives
it, is an untenable account of color. The remainder of his ar-
gument aims to answer the question of what the metaphysical
relation is between the state of an experiencing subject that we
take color to be and the colorless microphysical particles that we
take to constitute that subject. After rejecting SubstanceDualism,
Epiphenomenalism, and Wholistic or Emergent Materialism as
explanatorily inadequate, Sellars proposes that both color-states
and micro-physical particles should be understood as manifes-
tations of an underlying ontology on absolute processes.
Sellars’s Argument for an Ontology of
Absolute Processes
David Landy
1. Sellars’s argument for an ontology of absolute
processes
It is easy enough to read, understand, and appreciate a great
deal of Sellars’s philosophical systemwithout ever encountering
his thesis that an adequate representation of the ontology of the
world will be one that represents it as consisting of absolute pro-
cesses. In a philosopher infamous for his obscurity and impen-
etrability, this thesis manages to stand out as especially arcane.
Nonetheless, once one begins to delve the depths of Sellars’s de-
fenseof it, one realizes that there it has beenall along, peekingout
from behind the curtain in almost every major aspect of Sellars’s
work, from his attack on the Myth of the Given in “Empiricism
and the Philosophy of Mind” to his critique of Kant in Science
and Metaphysics, to his defense of scientiﬁc realism throughout
his career. There are a great many reasons why this surprisingly
ubiquitous aspect of Sellars’s philosophy has not received more
attention, but one of them is surely that insofar as scholars have
sought to understand Sellars’s arguments in support of this the-
sis, it has been particularly diﬃcult to ﬁnd an interpretation of
those arguments that makes them at all plausible, mostly ow-
ing to Sellars’s appeal to the ultimate homogeneity of color. I.e.,
Sellars’s dual claims that the original manifest-image concept of
color is the concept of something homogeneous—that it is the
concept of something every part of which is colored—and that
all subsequent reconceptions of color must also share this fea-
ture. What I will argue here is that that is because such scholars
have overlooked or misconstrued argumentative resources that
Sellars has available to him to defend these claims.1 Speciﬁcally,
I will argue that Sellars’s narrative-turn-argument proceeds as
follows.
We begin by seeing colors as being literal constituents of the
world, as substances. The world consists of color-stuﬀs. When
we notice that colors appear to be subjective in a way that pre-
cludes this understanding, we (or mythical Jones) transform our
concept of color accordingly: from the concept of an objective
substance to the concept of a state of the experiencing subject. As
the scientiﬁc image of persons in the world spreads, though, we
come to see subjects themselves as consisting of colorless atoms
in the void, and that understanding once again problematizes
our concept of color. What, we must ask, is the ontological rela-
tion of a state to the substance that is in that state such that the
former can genuinely be colored whereas the latter is not? Here
Sellars’s narrative turns to argument. First, he argues that re-
ductive materialism, which he understands as amounting to the
claim that color simply does not exist, is untenable, at least for
anyone who understands the role of color in our mental lives as
he does. The “somehow existence” of color is what accounts for
the diﬀerence between merely thinking some representational
content, and ostensibly seeing that content.
It is at this point in his argument that Sellars must rely on his
claim about the homogeneity of color. It is that claim that pre-
vents the Reductive Materialist from deploying his or her own
account the diﬀerence between merely thinking and ostensibly
1I owe a great deal of thanks to an anonymous referee for the Journal for
the History of Analytic Philosophy. Despite clear and emphatic warnings from
Pedro Amaral and Robert Kraut (two students of Sellars’s at the University of
Pittsburgh) among others, in previous iterations of this paper I had attempted
to show that Sellars’s argument did not turn on homogeneity at all. It was the
insightful and clearly-articulated objections of that referee that lead me to see
that my previous interpretation had been smuggling in homogeneity all along.
That realization sent me back to researching, and subsequently to developing
the paper in its current form.
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seeing. For Sellars’s rebuttal of Reductive Materialism to suc-
ceed, if that diﬀerence consists in the “somehow existence” of
color, then there must be something about color, e.g., its homo-
geneity, that resists its reduction to particulate matter. Borrow-
ing from Rosenthal’s recent paper on this topic, I will argue that
Sellars does give an argument for precisely this conclusion. I
will also argue that Rosenthal’s own understanding of that ar-
gument is mistaken, though, and that it proceeds along broadly
Kantian transcendental grounds. As I read him, Sellars argues
that homogeneity is a necessary feature of any object of possible
experience, manifest or theoretical.
Picking up Sellars’s master argument where it left oﬀ, we
next ﬁnd him arguing that the remaining contenders for an ac-
count of the relation of color-states to experiencing subjects—
Epiphenomenalism, Wholistic or Emergent Materialism, and
Substance Dualism—all share what he calls the epiphenomenal
form. I.e., they each cast physical substance as a causally closed
system to which color-states, whatever they are, are merely ap-
pended, without the potential for causal inﬂuence. Sellars re-
jects the epiphenomenal form, and the views that instantiate it,
as explanatorily inadequate and therefore unable to provide a
tenable resolution to the tension that they are aimed at relieving.
Finally, Sellars proposes his ontology of absolute processes as
a capable of achieving just this end. Speciﬁcally, Sellars argues
that what is needed is to cast both states and substances as them-
selvesmeremanifestations of some underlying ontological unity.
Thus, he proposes one ﬁnal categorial transformation for our
concept of color (and our particulate-substance concepts along
with it). Color-states become sensa: distinctly mental processes
that interact causally with other, non-mental processes (speciﬁ-
cally the processes that are the reality underlying the particulate
substance that appears to constitute the central nervous system).
With that summary now complete, I now turn to the details
of Sellars’s argument and the various objections that have been
raised to it.
2. The argument from homogeneity
One thing that is uncontroversial about Sellars’s argument for an
ontology of absolute processes is that as he presents it in all its
forms it always begins with a narrative about color. As Sellars
sees it, our concept of color begins as the concept of a kind of
stuﬀ; initially ‘color’ is a substance concept; we take the world to
be made of colors.
Thus I shall argue that the phenomena can be saved by supposing
our basic concept pertaining to red to have the form of a mass term,
the predicative concept is redhaving the form is an expanse of red. It is
most important to note, in view of the systematic grammatical am-
biguity of color words, that to make explicit the categorial status of
the term ‘red’ in the phrase ‘an expanse of red’, the latter should be
reformulated as ‘an expanse of red stuﬀ ’, where ‘stuﬀ’ carries with
it implications concerning the causal role of determinate portions
of stuﬀ in the physical world. (Sellars 1981a, 12)
Now, that is an odd claim, but we need not debate its merits here
because what Sellars needs for his story is not the claim that color
concepts begin as substance concepts, but only the much weaker
claim that our original concept of color is the concept of some
objective feature of theworld (be it a substance, a property, etc.).2
That becomes clear when we see the next step of Sellars’s story.
The distinction between seeing and ostensibly seeing is called for by
such facts as that one can have an experience which is intrinsically
like seeing a physical object when there is no physical object there,
and that one can have an experience which is intrinsically like
seeing the very redness of a physical object when either no physical
2Rosenberg (1982) contrasts Sellars’s approach to the original concept of
color, which he calls ‘ontic’, with what he calls ‘noetic’ approaches. Noetic
approaches take the most fundamental concept of color to be the concept of
a mental state, such as looks-red, and hold that the concept of being red is
constructed out of this more fundamental one. Of course, much of Sellars’s
“Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (Sellars 1956) is occupied with
refuting such noetic views, and I will not go into the details of those arguments
here.
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object is there to be seen, or the redness which one sees is not the
very redness of a physical object. (Sellars 1981a, 18)
Whatever our original concept of color, there comes a pointwhen
we realize that color is more mind dependent than that original
concept allows. So, we change our concept of what color is. That
change has two important components, as Sellars understands it.
Firstly, we stop representing color as something “out there,” as
an objective feature of theworld that we experience, and begin to
represent it as something “in here,” as a subjective feature of our
experience of that world. Secondly, in order to facilitate this ﬁrst
change, we also alter the categorial form of the concept of color.
We go from representing color as a substance or a property to
representing it as a state of the experiencing subject.
But what is the status of the redness which one sees when it is not
the very redness of a physical object? Phenomenologically speak-
ing, the normal status of expanses and volumes of color is to be
constituents of physical objects. What are we to say of expanses
and volumes of color stuﬀ which are not constituents of physical
objects? Here we must bear in mind what I have had to say about
the Myth of the Given. Thus, we must not suppose that if the true
theory of the status of expanses and volumes of color stuﬀ is one
according to which they have categorial status C, then they present
themselves phenomenologically as having this status.
(Sellars 1981a, 19)
Notice that these dual changes are precisely the changes that are
instigated by Sellars’s famous mythical genius Jones in Section
XVI of “Empiricism and the Philosophy ofMind” (1956).3 While
it might seem that the story of our concept of color can end with
this recategorization, that recategorization itself actually pre-
cipitates the central crisis of Sellars’s narrative. That is because
as what Sellars famously calls the scientiﬁc image marches on,
3Sellars there emphasizes that, “The entities introduced by the theory are
states of the perceiving subject, not a class of particulars,” and spends some time
explaining why this is important and how it is possible. See especially §61.
“we are now confronted with the idea that persons have actual
parts—micro physical particles.” (Sellars 1981c, 77–78) That is,
while it was all well and good to move color from an objective
property of the physical world to a subjective property of per-
sons when we were simultaneously thinking of persons as, for
example, non-physical substances, once we seek to explain the
nature of persons qua objects in the physical world, this position
becomes distinctly problematic. States of the perceiver threaten
to become states of colorless atoms in the void, and we suddenly
ﬁnd ourselves in need of an account of how color can be a state
of a system of colorless atoms. In his Carus Lectures, Sellars
presents what he takes to be the logical space of such accounts,
and considers and rejects representatives from each of the pos-
sible kinds of such accounts. Thus, he defends his ontology of
absolute processes via an argument from elimination.
Before considering those accounts and Sellars’s arguments
against them, it is worth emphasizing precisely what Jones’s
move is and is not. Jones’s reconceptualization of color does not
involve the positing of a new theoretical entity. What Jones does
is take our concept of color qua the concept of a substance or
property of worldly objects and gives that very concept a new
categorial form. This fact is important for two reasons. Firstly,
because sense impressions (the states of the perceiving subject
that Jones introduces) are not newly posited theoretical entities,
their ontological status is not yet in question. Jones does not in-
troduce a new kind of substance into our ontology (for example,
a new kind of mental substance), but rather reconceptualizes the
color that we originally experience as a substance (or property)
as being of a diﬀerent kind, as being a state. Thus, again, the
ontological states of color is unquestioned at this point. It may
well come into question later, but insofar as we are focusing our
attention on this very ﬁrst move of Jones’s, the ontological status
of color remains secured. We originally take color to be an ob-
jective feature of the world. Color exists out there. When Jones
recategorizes color as a state of the perceiving subject, this move
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alone is not suﬃcient for undermining that ontological status.
Color still exists. It is just that we have changed what we think
of color as being. Whereas pre-Jones we think of color’s exis-
tence as a matter of there existing some substance or property in
the world, post-Jones we think of color’s existence as a matter of
there existing some state of the experiencing subject. The notion
that color does not exist at all has not yet been introduced (and
as we will see farther along, Sellars has some reason to suppose
that this notion is a non-starter).
The second important feature of Jones’s recategorization of
color that it will be important to note is that what Jones does
is to change the categorial form that our representation of color
takes. Jones’s doing that, however, presupposes that there is
some content of those representations that remains unchanged.
That is, there must be something that it is to be a color that re-
mains through this transmogriﬁcation if it is to be color that is
conceived ﬁrst as a substance in the world and then as a state
of the experiencing subject. This point is particularly important
because it is Sellars’s repeated and emphatic insistence that one
such feature of color is its homogeneity that has led to the ob-
jections to which we will turn in a moment. Before doing so,
though, here is Sellars emphasizing the importance of there be-
ing some content of our original concept of color that serves as
the basis for our subsequent analogical extension of that concept
into a diﬀerent form.
Its being somehow the facing surface of a physical thing is amatter of
the fact that in developing a proto-theory to explain the possibility
of seeming to see the very redness of a physical object, when no
physical object is there to be seen—or if there is, it has no very
redness—the only available determinate concept in terms of which
to grasp the redness which is somehow present in the experience, is
that of redness as a physical stuﬀ, the redness of physical objects in
the spatial-temporal-causal order.
The latter concept must serve as the fundamentum from which ana-
logical thinking can form a proto-concept of red which has a new
categorial structure. It does this by forming a proto theory in which
items which satisfy an axiomatics of shape and color play roles
which promise to account for the fact in question.
(Sellars 1981a, 21)
The important question that we will confront in a moment is:
what precisely are the “axiomatics of shape and color”? I.e.,
what is it that Sellars takes to make color what it is, and thus
what it is that must be carried over from our original concept of
color through Jones’s transﬁguration of that concept. Those are
questions about the content of the concept color, but before we
turn our attention to that, a word is order about the changing
form of that (or those) concepts.
Sellars is explicit here that the form of concepts with which
he is concerned is their “categorial structure,” and happily Sell-
ars is elsewhere explicit on how he understands categorial form
(most notably in his aptly titled, “Towards a Theory of the Cate-
gories.”) What Sellars argues there is thatwhile categories have a
long history—since at least Aristotle’s equally aptly named, Cat-
egories—of being understood as object-level names for distinct
metaphysical kinds, we ought to followKant in thinking of them
as instead being meta-level conceptual sortals. Some examples
will help. Consider the statement,
Socrates is a substance.
On its face, that looks like a statement claiming of certain thing,
Socrates, that it is of a certain metaphysical kind, a substance.
As Sellars sees it, however, the underlying grammar of this state-
ment is more perspicuously represented as,
·Socrates·s are subject terms.4
4Just as single-quotes are used to refer to the typographical symbol between
them—e.g., ‘dog’ has three letters—dot-quotes as Sellars uses them serve to
refer to the function played by the word between them and any other function-
ally equivalent (or relevantly similar) word—e.g., both ‘Socrates’ in English
and ‘Sokrates’ in Greek are ·Socrates·s.
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That is, as Sellars sees it, to call Socrates a substance is to express
at the object level, the meta-level claim that the word (or its func-
tional equivalents) ‘Socrates’ is a subject term (as opposed to a
predicate term, for example). Similarly,
Yellow is a property,
becomes
·Yellow·s are predicates.
To classify yellow as a property is the object-level way of express-
ing themeta-level claim that the term ‘yellow’ is a predicate term.
As I mentioned earlier, Sellars ﬁnds the roots of this suggestion
in Kant, and looking at what Kant does with his version of this
claim can help us to understand what Sellars is up to. For exam-
ple, in the First Analogy Kant argues that substance can never be
created or destroyed (for reasons that need not concern us here).5
What that claim amounts to for Kant is that should we discover
that what we had been representing as a substance can be cre-
ated or destroyed, we ought to reconceive that representation as
being a representation of a mere mode of some other underly-
ing substance. Again, an examplewill help. Consider elephants.
One might have thought that elephants are parts of the ultimate
furniture of the universe. At least some of the substances that
exist are elephant substances. But we sadly discover that ele-
phants can be destroyed. They die, they rot away, etc. If Kant
is right that substances can never be created or destroyed, then
it follows that upon discovering the destruction of elephants,
we should conclude that elephants are not substances. So what
are they? Well, what Kant’s recommendation amounts to is that
we reconceive elephants as alterations of some underlying sub-
stance, for example, of atoms arranged elephant-wise. Another
way to put that conclusion, however, as Sellars and Kant see
it, is to say that we ought to change the role of ‘elephant’ in
5But which have concerned me elsewhere; compare Landy (2015a).
our language from a subject term to a predicate term. Instead
of representing the world as consisting of elephants by using
‘elephant’ as a name for a substance, we represent it as contain-
ing atoms arranged elephant-wise by predicating ‘elephant’ (or
‘arranged-elephantine-ly’) of ‘atoms’. That change is what Sellars
has in mind when he portrays Jones as reconceiving color as a
state of the experiencing subject. We go from using ‘color’ as a
subject term for a substance in the world to using it as a pred-
icate term that applies to certain experiencing subjects. Instead
of making judgments such as, ‘there is some red stuﬀ over there’,
we insteadmake judgments of the form, ‘Smith is in a redmental
state’, or ‘Smith perceives redly’.
For that change of categorial form to be a change of the concept
color, however, at least some substantial portion of the content
of that concept must remain. In the above example, changing
our concept of elephants from a substance concept to a predicate
concept kept ﬁxed the axiomatics of elephant shapes. We origi-
nally conceive of things of that shape as fundamental substances,
using ‘elephant’ as a subject term. We later reconceive of things
of that shape as a conglomeration of more fundamental sub-
stances, atoms, and so change the categorial form of ‘elephant’
to that of a predicate, ‘elephantine’. So, to fully understand the
transformation that Jones instigates in our concept of color, we
need to understand what the content-constituting axiomatics of
color are.
As I indicated earlier, it is in his articulation of these axiomatics
that critics take themselves to discover an illicit move in Sellars’s
argument for an ontology of absolute processes. Speciﬁcally,
Sellars certainly does take one of the axiomatics of the concept of
color to be that colors are homogeneous: every part of something
colored is also colored. And it does sometimes appear as though
Sellars’s argumentmoves from thatpropertyof color toprocesses
via the claim that only an ontology of absolute processes can
account for “ultimate homogeneity.” Here’s a quick and dirty
version of that argument.
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1. We originally conceive of colors as homogeneous stuﬀs in
the world.
2. In reconceiving colors as states of perceiving subjects, we
must keep the content of color concepts ﬁxed, while chang-
ing their categorial form.
3. Thus, we must conceive states of the perceiving subject as
homogeneous. (1, 2)
4. If the perceiving subject is itself composed of discrete atoms
in the void, it would not be homogeneous.
5. Thus, we cannot conceive of the perceiving subject as com-
posed of atoms in the void. (3, 4)
6. (Only) absolute processes are homogeneous.
7. We can (or must) conceive of the subject as an absolute
process.
Of course, Sellars’s argument does not proceed as quickly or dirt-
ily as this reconstruction portrays it. In fact, as Rosenberg notes,
the version of the argument that Sellars makes in the Carus
Lectures (Sellars 1981a,b,c) does not even make mention of ho-
mogeneity at all (although as Rosenberg also notes, it is implicit
there nonetheless).6 What is his argument, then? Well, the easi-
est way to answer that question is to focus on the structure of the
argument that Sellars does give in the lectures. As I anticipated
earlier, at its broadest, it is an argument from elimination, with
various accounts competing to explain the relation of color-like
states of the perceiving subject to the colorless substances (atoms
in the void) that purportedly constitute that subject. Thus, in
order to understand Sellars’s argument, it is crucial that we ﬁrst
understand the problem it is that Sellars takes that argument
to be aimed at solving. That problem can be put relatively suc-
6“The ‘ultimate homogeneity’ of a quantum of color (-stuﬀ) is precisely the
paradigm of an aspect of the ‘content’ of an ur-conceptualized color quantum
which must be invariantly carried over in successive theoretical transpositions
of that item or entity (to speak in neutral, transcendental terms) from one
categorial ‘form’ to another.” (Rosenberg 1982, 327–28)
cinctly in the form the question: what is themetaphysical relation
between a state and the substance in that state. The ﬁrst proposal
that Sellars considers for accounting for that relation is Reductive
Materialism, and it is in responding to Reductive Materialism
that Sellars makes his infamous appeal to homogeneity.
3. Reductive Materialism
In fact, though, as Sellars sees it, Reductive Materialism is not
really an answer to his question at all, but rather a denial that
the question even so much arises with respect to color. The Re-
ductive Materialist denies that Jones’s recategorization of color
is appropriate in the ﬁrst place because he or she holds that there
is no color, not in the world, and not in the mind.7 As Sellars
presents it, Reductive Materialism is the following thesis.
According to it a person is a complex system of micro-physical
particles, and what really goes on when a person senses a-cube-of-
pinkly consists in this system of micro-physical particles being in a
complex physical state. (Sellars 1981c, §79)
Whereas Jones recategorizes ‘color’ as the concept of a state of
the perceiving subject, and then Sellars puzzles over what the
relation of that state to the subject is, the Reductive Materialist
simply denies that distinction altogether. For the Reductive Ma-
terialist being a “state” of a complex system of micro-physical
particles is reducible to being a complex system ofmicro-physical
particles. There is no metaphysical “relation” to explicate here
because the relation is a straightforward identity.
The trouble with this view, as Sellars sees it, stems from the
fact that if one identiﬁes colors with complex systems of micro-
physical particles, because micro-physical particles are them-
selves colorless, this amounts to a denial of the reality of any-
thing corresponding to our original color concept. That is, this
7Or, as the Reductive Materialist, rather than Sellars, would put it, that
color is reducible to some suitable arrangement of colorless particles.
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does not count as a recategorization of the concept ‘color’, but
instead is a denial that there is any color at all. Of course, that
denial alone is not suﬃcient to render Reductive Materialism
untenable—maybe colors just don’t exist—but it is not clear ex-
actly what Sellars’s grounds are for resisting it, in part because
what he does say in the Carus Lectures is the following.
Obviously there are volumes of pink. No inventory of what there
is can meaningfully deny that fact. What is at stake is their status
and function in the scheme of things. (Sellars 1981c, 73)
Prima facie, that looks a lot like Sellars begging the question
against the Reductive Materialist: there does not look to be any
argument in support of his claim that “no inventory of what
there is can meaningfully deny” that there are volumes of pink.
He appears to take for granted that Jones’s recategorization is
the only viable option available and that there is some deep
incoherence or meaninglessness of Reductive Materialism. All
of this is supposed to be simply “obvious”. Were that the entirety
of Sellars position, that would be deeply unsatisfying.8 Happily,
it is not.
To see what is really going on here will require that we track
Sellars’s thinking back through material that is unfortunately
excluded from the Carus Lectures, which omission thus makes
it look as though Sellars is begging the question. To begin that
8Dennett, for example, has exactly this reaction to Sellars’s claim of obvi-
ousness in his contemporaneously published reaction to the Carus Lectures:
I guess I must grit my teeth and disagree with this proclamation of the
obvious. It is seldom obvious what is obvious, and this strikes me as a
prime case of a dubiously obvious claim. “Obviously there are volumes
of pink.” Well, in one sense, of course. I can take that particular volume
of pink ice and stick it back in the refrigerator; in this obvious sense, the
volume of pink goes right on existing in the dark. Here “pink" does not
mean “occurrent pink."Whenwe restrict our attention to “occurrent pink" it
is far from obvious tome (sullied asmymind is by theoretical partisanship)
that there are volumes of pink. (Dennett 1981, 104)
process, consider ﬁrst that while the thesis above concerning
the untenability of Reductive Materialism is not in fact obvious,
Sellars does it take to follow from a diﬀerent thesis, which is,
arguably, obvious. Namely, he takes it follow from the fact that
there is a phenomenological diﬀerence betweenmerely thinking
something to be the case and ostensibly perceiving it to be the
case. Let me explain.
Firstly, recall that for Sellars the representational content of
any piece of thinking is constituted by the inferential role that
that piece of thinking plays, by the rules that govern its use in
drawing inferences.9 Thus, to think, ‘the book over there is red’
is, for example, to commit oneself to not thinking that the book
over there is blue, or to thinking that the object over there has
pages, etc. (This is part and parcel of Sellars’s interpretation of
the meaning rubric as presenting, not a word-world relation,
but rather an identity between the functional roles of the terms
mentioned therein.) So, for Sellars, representational content is
constituted by the inferential role played by some linguistic or
mental token. Perceptions have representational content, and
Sellars (in)famously accepts the consequence that the represen-
tational content of a perception is constituted in the same way as
other representational content: by its inferential role. So, what
one thinks when one perceives that there is a red book over there
is the very same thing that one thinks when one, for example,
infers that there is a red book over there because Max said so.
Of course, Sellars also admits that there is an essential diﬀerence
between merely thinking that there is a red book over there
(because Max said so) and seeing that there is a red book over
there. He holds, however, that this diﬀerence is not a diﬀerence
in what one thinks in each case, but only in how one thinks it.
Perhaps what we should do is to recognize that the propositional
act, the thinking, the internal occurrence of the sentence ‘there
9As Sellars uses it, ‘thinking’ classiﬁes a representation as conceptual; the
representational content of non-conceptual representation, such as it is, is not
constituted inferentially.
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is a red book over there’ or ‘a book over there which is red on
the facing surface’, is of a unique kind. It is a visual thinking.
. . . over and above its propositional character as the occurrence of a
mental sentence, of amental symbol, the thinking has an additional
character by virtue of which it a seeing as contrasted with a mere
thinking. It has an additional character by virtue of which it is a
seeing. Well ok, as you can see, this is a move that is not incorrect,
but it simply classiﬁes the problem rather than answers it.
(Sellars 2015, 144)
Saying more about what that diﬀerence is, however, is tricky
business. The ﬁrst-pass answer to that question is that when we
perceive (or ostensibly perceive, or even imagine) a pink ice cube,
as opposed to merely thinking about a pink ice cube, the pink ice
cube is “somehow present in the thought.” It takes a theoretical-
explanatory account to say what this “somehow” amounts to,
but in the meantime Sellars does take even this much to imply
that if we follow the reductivematerialist and deny that anything
anywhere in any sense is colored, that would imply losing the
distinction between thinking that is perceiving and mere think-
ing. If what explains the diﬀerence betweenmerely thinking and
ostensibly perceiving is the “somehow” existence of color, then
denying the existence of color amounts to denying the diﬀerence
between merely thinking and ostensibly perceiving, and Sellars
is almost certainly right that denying this latter distinction is
obviously untenable.10
10As Sellars frames the problem, Reductive Materialism is, “no longer a
recategorization of the original entity, an unproblematic cube of pink, but
a recategorization of a supposedly postulated entity, a sense impression of a
cube of pink” (Sellars 1981c, 79). As I emphasized earlier, Jones does not
postulate a theoretical entity to explain color perception; rather he recategorizes
something that is straightforwardly observable: colors. So, in treating colors
as dispensable, the Reductive Materialist either attempts to deny something
obvious—that we observe a diﬀerence between mere thinking and ostensible
seeing, the somehow existence of color—or misunderstands the nature of that
diﬀerence—as a merely theoretical or postulated one. As we will see in a
moment, while there might be something to Sellars’s line here, it will take
more work than just this to make it plausible.
Of course, there is a big ‘if’ at the start of the previous sen-
tence, and deciding whether or not to accept the antecedent of
that conditional is precisely where the controversial issue of ho-
mogeneity makes its implicit appearance in Sellars’s argument.
To see this, consider some alternative ways of accounting for the
diﬀerence between merely thinking and ostensibly perceiving.
Sellars’s way of doing so might appear to take it for granted that
we do so via an appeal to the intrinsic features of ostensible per-
ceptions, but there have certainly been philosophers who have
balked at that approach. Contemporary disjunctivists, for exam-
ple, hold that the diﬀerence between modes of thinking is the
relation that each bears, or fails to bear in cases of non-veridical
perception, to some worldly object. Similarly, Dennett, in his
contemporaneously published comments on the Carus Lectures
suggests that the diﬀerence is merely etiological.11 Alternatively,
11In fact, in an interesting twist to note 8, a single page after puzzling over
Sellars’s apparently dogmatic claim that one cannot deny the somehow ex-
istence of pink, Dennett himself cites the motivation for this claim as being
precisely the one that I have suggested.
The undeniable appeal of introducing sensing-pinkly and its kin is that
it responds to our conviction that there is a manifest diﬀerence between
merely believing-to-be-pink and seeing-as-pink. The latter is sensuous in
a way the former is not. (Dennett 1981, 105)
Of course, Dennett disagrees with Sellars that this is the only, or best, way of
accounting for this diﬀerence, but at least he recognizes, if one page later than
hemight have, that Sellars does provide reasons for holding it, and even reasons
for its being obvious. For what it is worth, Dennett’s own argument against
Sellars in that piece is far fromclear. It consists of a series of rhetorical questions
probing the when and how of our epistemological access to the somehow
presence of pink. Dennett draws from these questions the conclusion that the
diﬀerence betweenmerely thinkingof apink ice cube and seeing apink ice cube
is not primarily one that is infallibly introspectively available, but is rather the
object of empirical psychological theory, and thus not obvious. Again, though,
I think Dennett mislocates what is supposed to be obvious here. It takes the
explanatory theorizing of the genius Jones to introduce the concept of sense
impressions into the conceptual repertoire of our Rylean ancestors, and to train
them to use it to (fallibly) introspect. So, the occurrence of sense impressions is
not intended to be either obvious or infallible. What is supposed to be obvious
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even if one ﬁnds it plausible that this diﬀerence must be ac-
counted for by features intrinsic to perception, one can certainly
resist Sellars’s claims that such intrinsic features can plausibly be
described as the “somehow existence” of color, or that an ade-
quate theory that casts sensation as nothing more than colorless
atoms in the void might not nonetheless include some distinc-
tive arrangement of such atoms that would itself account for this
diﬀerence.
All of which is to say that while Sellars’s ﬁrstmove in defend-
ing the obvious falsity of Reductive Materialism is to appeal to
the obvious fact of a diﬀerence between merely thinking and os-
tensibly perceiving, this cannot be the onlymove in his argument.
What Sellars needs is a further set of premises that show that this
diﬀerence itselfmust be explained by an appeal to the “somehow
existence” of color in ostensible perception. As it turns out, Sel-
lars does make such an argument, and that argument turns on
the necessity of representing manifest-image objects, and sense
impressions in turn, as homogeneous. As we will see in the next
section, what Sellars argues is precisely that it is because we
must represent manifest-image objects and sense impressions as
homogeneous, that both of the theses that constitute Reductive
Materialism must be false. Not only are colors qua states of the
here is that there is a diﬀerence between mere thinking and perceiving, that
something must explain this diﬀerence, and that that explanation will involve
the somehow presence of color.
In the end, it is this ﬁnal point, not the claim to obviousness, that Dennett
really wants to challenge, as he takes the crucial diﬀerence to be explained not
by the somehow existence of color, but rather by the etiology of our states of
belief (Dennett 1981, 107). It is no coincidence that hemakes this point by using
an example of his being on a sailing trip—of course—with Fodor of all people.
Such appeals to etiology have become increasingly familiar, and notoriously
diﬃcult to maintain, in no small part because of the problem of deviant causal
chains. A natural solution to that problem, of course, is the Sellarsian one
of moving from a backward-looking etiological account of perception to a
forward-looking critical normative one. See, for example, Rosenberg (1994,
chaps. 3, 5).
experiencing subject not merely colorless atoms in the void, but
neither are physical objects.
Establishing Sellars’s argument for that radical thesis, how-
ever, is still someways oﬀ. For the moment, the next item on our
agendawill be to examine the precise role of homogeneity in Sel-
lars’s defense against Reductive Materialism. As noted earlier,
scholars have taken Sellars to be committed to two controver-
sial theses regarding homogeneity. The ﬁrst is that our original
representations of colors represent them as homogeneous; the
second is that this alleged feature of our original color concepts
must be preserved through all categorial transformations of those
concepts. In the following section, I begin with the objections to
these theses, and then turn to their defense.
4. In defense of homogeneity
Two early proponents of the aforementioned forms of objections
areC.A.Hooker and JamesMcGilvray, and their presentations of
these objectionswill be of particular use here because they frame
two of the most important aspects of such objections.12 The ﬁrst
is Sellars’s entitlement to the claim that colors are originally and
essentially represented as homogeneous. Here is Hooker.
When I turnmymind in uponmy own conceptual scheme—to par-
ody Hume’s analytical methodology—I do not ﬁnd here any such
concepts of simple, homogeneous properties. What I do ﬁnd in-
stead is a yawning gap bespeaking ignorance as to the true natures
of these properties. To put the point critically: how does or could
ostensive acquaintance of secondary qualities help to decide such
an issue? We see for example, colour expanses, coloured objects,
colour volumes, colour synthesis and analysis and so on. Does
this help to determine whether what we see are other properties
12Johanna Seibt, an authority on all things Sellars and process related, takes
these two forms of objections to be decisive, and so presents her own version
of Sellars’s argument that does awaywith his claims about homogeneity (Seibt
2015, 208).
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disguised as colours at a collective level? I think not. To the con-
trary, the latter group of experiences all point to the complexity of
colours. It seems rather common in everyday life to leap from
I do not explicitly experience X as ϕ.
to
I experience X as not-ϕ.
Perhaps this explains howmany people (Sellars qua commonman,
included?) have arrived at the idea that secondary qualities are
simple and homogeneous. For it is true that we do not explicitly
experience themas reducible complex collective properties. But the
transition from thence to the conclusion that they are not complex
collective properties is notoriously unjustiﬁed. (Hooker 1977, 341)
Hooker is willing to concede to Sellars that we do not experience
color as reducible and complex, but rightly points out that this
alone is insuﬃcient to establish that we do experience them as
homogeneous and simple. Of course, Sellars does not infer the
homogeneity and simplicity of color in this way—he is explicit
that the homogeneity and simplicity of colors are axiomatic—but
this invalid inference is Hooker’s best attempt at being charitable
to Sellars’s argument as he understands it, and it is enough to call
our attention to the apparent lack of support that Sellars oﬀers
for this seemingly non-trivial claim.
McGilvray on the other hand recognizes that Sellars takes ho-
mogeneity and simplicity to be part of the axiomatics of our
concept of color, but calls into question Sellars grounds for do-
ing so.
Is the sensum in some sense homogeneous? Sellars seems to insist
that it is: ‘is homogeneous’ is treated as predicative (a notion ex-
plained inmore detail later), perhaps (Sellars does not tell us) in the
same way as ‘is pink’ (‘pinks’) is treated as predicative. Because ‘is
homogeneous’ is treated as predicative, there must be something
homogeneous, just as there must be something which is pink (in
some sense). ‘Pure processes’ themselves (or pure process itself?),
not based upon particles or things, are the candidates.
(McGilvray 1983, 246)
AsMcGilvray sees it, Sellars’s original sin in this argument is not
somuch his commitment to homogeneity, but rather his commit-
ment to the ontological-cum-grammatical status of homogeneity.
As he puts it, if homogeneitymust be treated as a predicate, then
theremust be something homogeneous, and thus Sellars appears
to earn himself the reality of color, and in turn, perhaps even the
reality of pure processes. As McGilvray points out, however,
there are alternatives to this understanding of homogeneity.
[W]hatever the precise status of homogeneity, it is clear that Sellars
insists that in some sense there is somethingwhich ‘really is’ homo-
geneous. This is part of what I mean by saying that homogeneity
is ‘predicative’. More than that, to say that homogeneity is pred-
icative is to make a grammatical point:‘homogeneous’, whatever
its status-to-be, is like ‘pink’ and unlike (e.g.) a manner adverbial.
The diﬃculty I see is that in the relevant contexts ‘homogeneous’
(with regard to homogeneity of color) is better treated as a manner
adverbial, and I suspect too thatwe need not accept the ‘metaphysi-
cal’ aspect of predicativity, that something (processes, pure process
itself) ‘is’ homogeneous. Prima facie evidence does not count for
much in the heady atmosphere of metaphysics, but it serves as a
starting point. Sensa might be homogeneously red, not both ho-
mogeneous and red. (McGilvray 1983, 249)
McGilvray’s point is that if one can understand the homogeneity
of color adverbially rather than adjectivally, then one need not
be committed to anything’s being homogeneous. For example,
if one claims that a certain avocado is fresh, one is committed
to there existing something fresh: that avocado. If, however,
one claims that a certain bench is freshly painted, one is not
similarly committed to there existing anything that is fresh. The
upshot for McGilvray is that if one can cast homogeneity as
an adverb instead of an adjective, then Sellars’s inference from
the homogeneity of color to the existence of absolute processes
on the grounds that only absolute processes are homogeneous,
would be invalid. It would be open to a rival metaphysician-
cum-grammarian to propose an alternative such as, for example,
particulate substances move homogeneously, and to hold that
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the homogeneity of color owes to this homogeneous movement
of colorless particles. Such a thesis would appear to preserve
the ultimate homogeneity of color without committing to there
being some thing that is homogeneous.13
Returning to Hooker, we also ﬁnd him raising a second objec-
tion Sellars’s argument: even were we to grant that our original
concept of color is a concept of something homogeneous, it does
not follow that this homogeneity must be preserved in all future
manifestations of that concept.
Even granting that Sellars’s characterisation of the Manifest Image
is acceptable, why would it be necessary to preserve the simplicity
and homogeneity of the Manifest Image concepts? That is, why is
Sellars justiﬁed in construing his Principle of FrameworkAdequacy
sowidely? Sellarsmain argument for his principle seems to be this:
if S′ is to be an adequate successor conceptual framework to S then
S′ must be capable of explaining all the phenomena describable
in S; but S′ will not be capable of this unless it is able to recon-
struct within its resources the same logical structures as occur in
S. Sellars does not construe explanation between successor frame-
works as a deduction of S from S′. He recognises that this will not
do as a model even for applications within science (for example,
from classical mechanics to relativity theory), let alone for science.
Rather he construes it as a derivation in S′ of why S’s descriptions,
observational and theoretical, are as accurate as they are (and, if
S′ is a truly comprehensive scheme, of why S’s descriptions are as
inaccurate as they are). Nonetheless this still requires reference to
S’s conceptual structure. (Hooker 1977, 343)
Whereas Hooker’s ﬁrst objection was to the notion of taking
homogeneity as a feature of our original concept of color, his
objection here is that even putting that point aside, it does not
follow, and Sellars does not appear to oﬀer an argument, that ho-
13Aimed as it is at the Reductive Materialist, Sellars’s argument ought to be
concerned with undermining something almost identical to this alternative.
So while McGilvray oﬀers real insight into the structure of the diﬃculty that
Sellars faces here, what he misses is Sellars’s attempt to meet that diﬃculty
head on!
mogeneity is an axiomatic or essential feature of that concept. For
example, it might be that while we originally conceive of color
as a homogeneous substance, in reconceiving it as a state of the
perceiver, we also come to think of it as heterogeneous, perhaps
exactly becausewedonot think of perceivers as themselves being
homogeneous.
More recently, David Rosenthal (2015) has added what I take
to be both a robust charitable defense of both of these claims of
Sellars’s—that homogeneity is an original feature of our concept
of color, and that it is an essential feature of that concept—that
presents some of Sellars’s own reasons in support of them, but
also an argument for rejecting Sellars’s conclusion that homo-
geneity is incompatible with a sense impression’s actually being
a non-homogeneous particulate neural state. As Rosenthal sees
it, Sellars is correct to hold that homogeneity is an intrinsic and
essential feature of the conscious perception of color, but a men-
tal state’s being conscious owes to its structure, not its intrinsic
features, and so it might well turn out that these states are in-
trinsically non-homogeneous. The details of both Rosenthal’s
defense of Sellars’s claims and his argument against them are
well worth delving into because I hope to show that each of-
fers an important clue in its own way to seeing our way clear
to Sellars’s actual and most tenable position. Speciﬁcally, what I
hope to show is that the argument that Rosenthal oﬀers on Sell-
ars’s behalf is a good one, except that Rosenthal understands its
scope as being narrower than it is. When we supplement Rosen-
thal’s argument with Sellars’s transcendental realism, it turns out
that homogeneity is a necessary feature of any and all objects
of possible experience, including the sense impressions that are
represented by Jones’s theoretical-explanatory framework.
Wecanbeginour investigationofRosenthal’s defense of homo-
geneity by returning to that very explanatory framework itself.
What genius Jones aims to explain is our conceptual responses
to certain worldly stimuli.
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[T]he aim is to explain the correlation of the conceptual represen-
tations in question with those features of the objects of perception
which, on occasion, both make them true and are responsible for
bringing them about. (Sellars 1967, §43)
The explanation that Jones gives is that there are certain states of
the perceiver, sense impressions, which are the causal intermedi-
aries between these objects and our conceptual representations.
For example, there is some such sense impression that makes it
the case that we respond with ‘red’ to both red objects seen in
daylight and to white objects seen in red light. As Sellars un-
derstands this explanation, though, it is not enough just to say
that there is some such state,14 but one must also say what it is
about such states that allow them to play this speciﬁc role. And,
of course, Jones does just this. He models sense impressions on
our conceptually-prior understanding of the color of physical
objects.
For even in normal cases there is the genuine question, “Why does
the perceiver conceptually represent a red (blue, etc.) rectangular
(circular, etc.) object in the presence of an object having these qual-
ities?” The answer would seem to require that all the possible
ways in which conceptual representations of colour and shape can
resemble and diﬀer correspond to ways in which their immediate
non-conceptual occasions, which must surely be construed as states
of the perceiver, can resemble and diﬀer.
Thus, these non-conceptual states must have characteristics which,
without being colours, are suﬃciently analogous to colour to enable
these states to play this guiding role. (Sellars 1967, §§44–45)
Sense impressions of colors are posited as exhibiting a structure
that is themental analogueof the structure thatperceptible colors
are represented as standing in to one another in our manifest-
image representations of objects. It is by supposing that they
14That would be of a piece with the classic example of explaining why a
certain medicine puts one to sleep by appealing to its soporiﬁc qualities.
have such a structure that this posit comes to have the explana-
tory force that it does. This structure is what Rosenthal calls the
quality-space theory (QST).
[T]he type a token mental quality belongs to is determined by
the similarities and diﬀerences that token bears to tokens of other
mental-quality types in the relevant family. (Rosenthal 2015, 162)
So, for example, a certain state of the perceiver will be a red-
sensation just in case it stands in the mental-analogue relation of
being between yellow-sensations and orange-sensations. A state
of the perceiver will be a triangle-sensation just in case it stands
in relations to other shape-sensations that are isomorphic to the
relations that triangles stand in to other shapes, etc.
Importantly, what Rosenthal takes to follow from QST is that
because such states of the perceiver are strictly analogous to
the properties of manifest-image objects as we represent them,
certain facts that are true of how those objects are represented
will necessarily also be true of sense impressions as represented
by QST. Most speciﬁcally, Rosenthal ﬁnds in Sellars a powerful
argument that manifest-image objects are, in some sense, neces-
sarily represented as homogenous, and that because of how QST
is constructed, sense impressions must also be so represented.
Here is the second part of that argument (which will make the
ﬁrst part clear enough by implication).
Consider then any arbitrary mental part of that mental triangu-
lar expanse. Perhaps the mental color quality within the mental
triangular expanse varies, so that the mental part will itself be
a mental expanse with mental boundaries of contrasting mental
colors. But perhaps the mental color quality within the mental tri-
angular expanse is uniform; in that case what demarcates the part
are imaginary mental borders of some contrasting color.
In either case, the mental area that constitutes that arbitrary part
will itself have to exhibit somemental color quality; otherwise there
would simply be no way to ﬁx the mental boundaries of the mental
part. The same will hold in turn for any smaller mental part of the
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initial mental part. Every mental part of a mental quality of a red
triangle will have to exhibit a mental color quality.
Ultimate homogeneity occurs if every proper part of a mental ex-
panse of a mental color quality itself exhibits some mental color
quality. QST gives us an account of just what it is for a mental
color quality to have parts at all, and it is unlikely that any other
theory will do so. And QST by itself implies ultimate homogeneity
of mental quality qualities. (Rosenthal 2015, 177)
I will call this the boundary argument. It will be helpful here to
have an illustration to make the boundary argument more vivid.
So, consider the image of a triangle below (which is, of course,
of the same type as the model of the QST triangle-sensation).
For this triangle to consist of a homogeneous expanse of color, it
must be that every part of it also consists of an expanse of color.
To test whether this is so, we can select some arbitrary part of it
and examine whether it is an expanse of color. Let’s do that.
To examine a part of the triangle, we need to distinguish that
part from the rest of the triangle. Rosenthal’s point is that the
only way that we can do this is by constructing a boundary, real
or imagined, within the triangle. However, because construct-
ing that boundary requires that we contrast the selected part
with the remainder of the triangle, both the selected part and
the remainder must be colored. Since this will be true of any
arbitrarily-selected part of the triangle, it will be true of all parts
of the triangle, and thus the triangle is homogeneous. Since the
mental analogues of manifest-image colored objects stand in re-
lations to each other that are isomorphic to the relations that their
manifest-image colored objects stand in to each other (via QST),
it must be that sense impressions are homogeneous as well.
To certain readers the above argument will sound familiar
insofar as it bears a striking resemblance to considerations that
Kant adduces in theAxiomsof IntuitionandAnticipationsofPer-
ception in defense of his theses that, roughly, all objects of pos-
sible experience have both a quantiﬁable spatiotemporal form
and a qualitative content.15 As I will argue farther along, this
similarity is no mere coincidence, and in fact holds the key to
understanding properly Sellars’s own argument. Putting that
point aside for the moment, however, it is worth noting that
while Rosenthal puts this argument entirely in terms of color
and shape, Kant’s version of the argument is more general, but
equally compelling.16 Kant’s claim is that for any arbitrarily se-
lected object of experience at all, that object can only be repre-
sented as such, by delimiting its spatiotemporal boundaries, and
that doing this requires that the object be represented as having
some quality or another, be it color, sound, resistance to pressure,
etc. Sellars explicitly endorses the same generalized conclusion,
and ties it speciﬁcally to homogeneity.
AsBerkeley, Kant, andWhitehead, among others, have pointed out,
physical objects cannot have primary qualities only—for structural
and mathematical properties presuppose what might be called
15Or, as Kant (1781/1787) put it, that “All intuitions are extensive magni-
tudes” (A162/B202), and “In all appearances the real, which is an object of the
sensation, has intensive magnitude, i.e., a degree” (A165/B207).
16As P. F. Strawson brings out so brilliantly in the second chapter of Indi-
viduals (1959) in which he constructs an auditory model to make the same
point.
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“content qualities.” . . . Thus the rejection of a phenomenalistic anal-
ysis of the framework of common sense requires that the physical
objects of this frameworkhaveperceptible qualitative content. And,
once one realizes this, one sees that there is no alternative to con-
struing these physical objects as colored in the literal occurrent
sense. One might wish to say that this framework—which has as
its central constituents itemswhich are in this sense colored through
and through—is, from the standpoint of theoretically-oriented sci-
ence, false, although enabling a behavioral adjustment of suﬃcient
accuracy for the practical purposes of life. (Sellars 1977, §§54–55)
Rosenthal is certainly right, then, that Sellars takes himself to
follow Kant (and Berkeley andWhitehead)17 in holding that rep-
resentingmanifest-image objects aswell as the sense impressions
that are modelled on them requires representing them as having
sensible qualities, and therefore as being homogeneous.18 More
on that in a moment, though.
For now, the next task on our agenda is to see why it is that
Rosenthal follows Sellars this far, but nonetheless rejects his
conclusion that homogeneity is incompatible with a sense im-
pression’s actually being a non-homogeneous particulate neural
17As Sellars sees it all three of these ﬁgures agreed that objects of represen-
tation must have qualitative features in addition to their merely quantitative
ones, but each drew radically diﬀerent conclusions from this thesis. Whereas
Kant took it to imply that physical objects must have qualitative features (al-
though not the qualitative features of sensation, e.g., color, but rather features
corresponding to these, e.g., the moment of force), Berkeley, being committed to
the esse of colors being percipi, took it to imply that the esse of physical objects
is also percipi (Sellars 1963, §36 n).
18One note of caution: in addition to the considerations just outlined, Kant
is also explicitly concernedwith a diﬀerent kind of homogeneity in the Axioms.
As we have seen, what concerns Sellars’s is the alleged fact that every part of
an expanse of color is also an expanse of color. What concerns Kant is that the
units that are added together, or synthesized, to formawhole arehomogeneous
with each other, e.g., that when we measure the length of a given object, the
inch markers on the ruler that we use are all of uniform lengths. Part of what
Kant is up to is to show that these two senses of homogeneity are, in fact,
necessarily related, but it is important for us to keep them distinct, if only to
avoid possible confusion.
state. As Rosenthal understands Sellars’s argument, it is an en-
thymeme, and the premise that Sellars needs to complete the
argument is not one that we ought to accept. Speciﬁcally, what
Rosenthal takes Sellars argument to establish successfully is that
our introspective awareness of sense impressions will always be of
them as homogeneous.
We are introspectively aware of mental color qualities in respect of
the qualitative similarities and diﬀerences that constitute the rele-
vant quality space. Introspection represents mental color qualities
as ultimately homogeneous because QST does.
(Rosenthal 2015, 177)
Since, however, Rosenthal holds that our introspective awareness
of a mental state as having a quality does not guarantee that that
mental state really does have that quality, he concludes that some
additional premise is needed to move from our mental states’
necessarily appearing to be homogeneous to their actually being
homogeneous.
So mental qualities of color are ultimately homogeneous. But the
ultimate homogeneity that QST delivers results in no diﬃculty
for a scientiﬁc treatment of sense impressions, nor any diﬃculty
for identifying those sense impressions with neural states whose
properties exhibit no such ultimate homogeneity.
The diﬃculty Sellars saw arose only because of an added premise.
Sellars held that the relative similarities and diﬀerences that de-
termine location in a quality space ﬁx the types of mental quality
not in a relative way, but in respect of the intrinsic nature of those
mental qualities. (Rosenthal 2015, 177–78)
Rosenthal sees room here for an account of sense impressions
according to which sense impressions appear as they do to intro-
spection (as homogeneous) because of their structural relations to
each other, but also according to which sense impressions them-
selves are not as they appear, are not intrinsically homogeneous.
Rosenthal’s diagnosis of Sellars’s mistake is as surprising as it is
damning.
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The only consideration that can explain Sellars’s conviction that
Jones’s theory determines the intrinsic nature of sense impressions
is his assumption that such states always occur consciously.
(Rosenthal 2015, 179)
What Rosenthal suggests is that Sellars mistakenly held that
sense impressions must be as they appear because Sellars did
not countenance the possibility of non-conscious mental states.
Great foe of the Myth of the Given that he is, especially with
respect to how our mental states appear to us, it would be shock-
ing to discover Sellars’s lifelong project of properly accounting
for the nature of sense impressions was undermined by his re-
jecting the possibility of a seems/is distinction with respect to
those sense impressions on the grounds that they are always
consciously perceived. As Rosenthal himself points out, the ac-
ceptance of these commitments is utterly disastrous for many of
the other parts of Sellars’s philosophical agenda.
And things are arguablyworse. If thewayweare subjectively aware
of qualitative states trumps any other knowledge we could have
about them, the way QST taxonomizes mental qualities would be
mistaken whenever it departed from the deliverances of subjective
awareness. And we cannot count on subjective awareness itself if,
as argued earlier, such awareness can misrepresent what mental
state one is in. (Rosenthal 2015, 180)
And things are arguably worse still! Not only would QST itself,
the very core of Jones’s explanatory posit, be undermined by
the supposition that introspective awareness is infallible, but so
would the need for any explanatory hypotheses concerning the
mind at all. If we are infallibly aware of the intrinsic nature of
all of our mental states, then there can never arise the need to
move beyond introspective phenomenology at all. In fact, if we
are infallibly aware of the intrinsic nature of our all of ourmental
states, then it turns out that the Myth of the Given is no myth at
all. Merely by being in a state of awareness of somemental state,
we are thereby aware of it has having whatever categorial status
it does.
Suﬃce it to say, that I agreewithRosenthal that if this is the root
of Sellars’smistake, it is a doozy. As is likely obvious at this point,
where I part company with Rosenthal, is in thinking that Sellars
makes the mistake of holding that sense impressions must be as
they appear to us at all, or that he makes that mistake because
he holds that sense impressions are intrinsically conscious. The
question, then, is: how does Sellars’s argument in fact proceed?
Before answering that question, it will be worthwhile to take
stock of where things stand having made our way through
Rosenthal’s interpretation of and objection to Sellars’s argument.
In particular, Rosenthal has uncovered what I take to be an es-
sential piece of the interpretive puzzle. Hooker and McGilvray
both balked at Sellars’s claims that we necessarily represent,
ﬁrst, manifest-image objects, then sense impressions, as homo-
geneous. Both found these claims to be unsupported dogma-
tism. Recall Hooker: “When I turn my mind in upon my own
conceptual scheme . . . I do not ﬁnd here any such concepts of
simple, homogeneous properties.” And McGilvray: “Is the sen-
sum in some sense homogeneous? Sellars seems to insist that it
is.” What Rosenthal reveals is that Sellars’s claim that manifest-
image objects and sense impressions are necessarily represented
by us as homogeneous is not amerely dogmatic insistence, but is,
in fact, the conclusion of an argument: the boundary argument.
We must represent manifest-image objects as homogeneous be-
cause answering the question of whether they are homogeneous
requires us to represent arbitrarily-selected parts of such ob-
jects, and doing that requires that we represent those objects
as being homogeneous. Since sense impressions are necessar-
ily represented via structural analogies with our representations
of manifest-image objects, they must share this structural fea-
ture. It is this ﬁnal move that also guarantees that any categorial
transformation of the concept of color will retain homogeneity
as one of the axiomatics of its content. Thus is Hooker’s second
objection also met by Rosenthal. So, at least some progress has
been made on the question of whether homogeneity is anything
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but Sellarsian dogmatism. We now at least have an argument in
support of Sellars’s claims, if also an important further objection
to that argument.
That progress, however, will be for naught unless Rosenthal’s
objection can also be met. How can Sellars defend the claim
that our representation of sense impressions as homogeneous
corresponds to their actually being homogeneous. As I indicated
earlier, I believe that the surprising answer to that question is—
to put it so simply as to be utterly mysterious—transcendental
idealism.19
5. Sellars’s transcendental idealism
To begin tomake this answer less surprising and lessmysterious,
consider ﬁrst a quote fromRosenthal and then a quote fromKant.
Nor do the quality-space considerations that show mental color
qualities to be ultimately homogeneous apply to perceptible phys-
ical colors. As with mental color qualities, the visible boundaries
of proper parts of colored expanses are determined by contrasts in
perceptible colors; so any visible part of such an expanse will itself
be colored. But this applies only to proper parts that are visible,
and visible expanses of perceptible color always have proper parts
too tiny to be visible. Visible color expanses consciously appear to
be ultimately homogeneous, but in reality they are not.
(Rosenthal 2015, 179)
Rosenthal is willing to grant that the visible color expanses of
manifest-imageobjects appear to behomogeneous, but notes that
such objects have parts that are too small to be visible. These
expanses, he holds, because they are not visible, might well
be non-homogeneous. By contrast, here is Kant’s very quick
and snarky reply to Eberhard concerning an objection similar to
Rosenthal’s that Eberhard makes to Kant.
19This answer is surprising, in part, because Sellars himself argues for a
version of transcendental realism! More on that in a moment.
Thus, according to the Critique, everything in an appearance is
itself still appearance, however far the understanding may resolve
it into its parts and demonstrate the actuality of parts which are no
longer clearly perceptible to the senses; according toMr. Eberhard,
however, they then immediately cease to be appearances and are
the thing itself. (Kant 1790, 210/302)
And here is a passage from the Critique in which Kant makes just
the point that he cites to Eberhard.
The postulate for cognizing the actuality of things requires percep-
tion, thus sensation of which one is conscious—not immediate per-
ception of the object itself the existence of which is to be cognized,
but still its connection with some actual perception in accordance
with the analogies of experience, which exhibit all real connection
in an experience in general. . . . Thus we cognize the existence of
a magnetic matter penetrating all bodies from the perception of
attracted iron ﬁlings, although an immediate perception of this
matter is impossible for us given the constitution of our organs.
For in accordance with the laws of sensibility and the context of
our perceptions we could also happen upon the immediate empir-
ical intuition of it in an experience if our senses, the crudeness of
which does not aﬀect the form of possible experience in general,
were ﬁner. Thus wherever perception and whatever is appended
to it in accordance with empirical laws reaches, there too reaches
our cognition of the existence of things.
(Kant 1781/1787, A225–26/B272–73)
Kant’s point in these two passages is that what he has attempted
to present in the Critique are the necessary conditions for repre-
senting all objects of possible experience. Insofar as the project
has been a success, then (to translate Kant’s argument into Sell-
ars’s favored idioms) those conditions are conditions not merely
of the representation ofmanifest-image objects, but also, because
theoretical representations are analogical extensions of the rep-
resentation of such objects, to representations of scientiﬁc-image
objects as well. Even though we can have no “direct observa-
tion” of magnetic matter, the representation of magnetic matter
is nonetheless subject to the same conditions as is that on which
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we model it. The theoretical representation of magnetic matter
does indicate certain aspects of how that matter would appear
to an experiencing subject who had sensory organs suitable for
experiencing it. And thatmode of appearingwould, because the
necessary conditions that Kant takes himself to discover make
no appeal to the contingent constitution of our sensory organs,
be subject to those conditions. Or, as Kant puts it in bludgeoning
Eberhard, an object’s being smaller does not make it noumenal.
How does this help Sellars? Well, Rosenthal’s objection to Sel-
lars appears to have a form similar to Eberhard’s objection to
Kant. Just as Eberhard objects to Kant that objects too small for
us to experiencemight not be subject to the Categories, so Rosen-
thal objects to Sellars that objects too small for us to seemight not
be homogeneous. Kant’s response to Eberhard is that because
the Categories are the necessary condition for the representation
of any object of possible experience, these include objects of theo-
retical representation. Similarly, if the argument from boundary
conditions that Rosenthal himself ﬁnds in Sellars can be general-
ized in the way that I indicated earlier (and indicated that Kant
and Sellars themselves, in fact, generalize it), homogeneity will
turn out to be a necessary condition on the representation of any
object of possible experience, manifest or theoretical. “Sowhat?”
one imagines Rosenthal protesting. “Wemight necessarily repre-
sent objects as being homogeneous, but they might nonetheless
benon-homogeneous.” Tomake sense of that objection, however,
it must be possible to understand what Rosenthal means when
he would protest that objects might be non-homogeneous. If,
however, representing an object as homogeneous is a necessary
condition of representing an object at all, then understanding
Rosenthal becomes impossible.20
20And following Kant, this is not because there is anything contradictory in
Rosenthal’s proposal—just as there is nothing contradictory in thinking of,
e.g., noumenal causation—but rather because that proposal is incompatible
with the necessary conditions of our representative powers. The concept of
something non-homogeneous is not incoherent, but it is beyond our power of
But wait! As I mentioned earlier, Sellars is a transcendental
realist, not a transcendental idealist, so this line of argumenta-
tion would appear to be unavailable to him. One way of framing
this line of resistance to Rosenthal would be cast him as mistak-
enly attempting to apply what are merely our forms of repre-
sentation (the concept of homogeneity and its complement non-
homogeneity) to noumenal objects, or things in themselves. Sel-
lars cannot object to that, though, because he himself advocates
for precisely the same thing. So, this defense is a non-starter.
This objection, however, itself misunderstands the form that
Sellars’s transcendental realism takes.21 For Sellars, and for Sell-
ars’s Kant, the concept of a noumenal object, and the correspond-
ing thesis of transcendental realism, is essentially contrastive. The
concept of a phenomenon is the concept of an object as it is rep-
resented using our forms of representation. The concept of a
noumenon is the concept of an object as it is represented using a
form of representation other than our own. Both Kant and Sell-
ars reject the notion that we can make any sense of the notion of
an object apart from all forms of representation whatsoever. For
them, an object just is an object of representation. Thus, the issue
of transcendental idealism versus transcendental realism, the is-
sue of whether we can cognize noumena, for Kant and Sellars,
boils down to the issue of whether we can represent objects us-
ing a form of representation other than our own. Sellars argues
that we can. That argument is the one with which the entirety of
this paper is concerned.22 The form of representation other than
our own that Sellars holds we can, and ought to, employ is pre-
cisely his ontology of absolute processes. As we will see in the
following sections, the conceptual and grammatical structure of
representation to conceive of anything actually being non-homogeneous.
21What follows is a version of an argument that Imake inKant’s Inferentialism
(Landy 2015b), in the Postscript on Transcendental Idealism.
22A brief confession: in Kant’s Inferentialism (Landy 2015b) I went in search
of an argument from Sellars to support his transcendental realism, but came
up empty handed. The current paper is meant to correct that oversight.
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 7 no. 1 [17]
process thought and talk is an alternative to the Categories and
judgmental form of substance and accident.
Back to homogeneity. If the above is right, then Sellars’s tran-
scendental realism consists of his abandonment of an ontology
of substance and accident in favor an ontology of absolute pro-
cesses. What is clear, however, is that Sellars holds—for exactly
the reasons that Rosenthal cites—that homogeneitywill be a nec-
essary condition for either of those forms of representation.23 In
fact, it is precisely because of the boundary argument that Rosen-
thal presents (in its more general form) that Sellars holds that we
must adopt this new categorial form of thinking. What follows,
however, is that if the most general version of the boundary ar-
gument is correct, then there is no alternative way to represent
objects. And if the conception of noumena that I have portrayed
Kant and Sellars as both adopting is correct (another big if!) then
talk of objects apart from any form of representing them is un-
tenable. So, if homogeneity is a necessary feature of any possible
form representation of objects, then the contrast that Rosenthal
seeks to draw between our conception of manifest-image objects
and sense impressions and the way each of those is “in itself”
disappears.24 The very notion of a sense impression’s intrinsic
23An insightful anonymous referee raises the question of whether Sellars
does, in fact, hold that all objects of representation, including those of the-
oretical representation, must be homogeneous, and points out that Sellars
repeatedly insists that objects of theoretical representation need not have all or
any of the properties that manifest objects do. (The referee cited Sellars (1963),
§100, but see also Sellars’s objection toHesse in Sellars (1977), in especially §24,
which is even more explicit, I think.) The key point to see, though, is that in
these cases what Sellars is advocating for is our ability to construct theoretical
representations of qualities on the basis of their similarity, but not identity, to
manifest qualities. Homogeneity, however, is not an object-level quality, but
a structural feature of qualities themselves, and if my argument thus far has
been sound, then it is a necessary feature of all qualities. That is, while we
can represent novel qualities via theoretical representation, and even novel
categories such as “process”, there are nonetheless limits to our capacity for
novelty, even for Sellars, and I am arguing that homogeneity is one of those.
24Or, more accurately, the distinction between the way things appear and
qualities is itself already subject to the necessary conditions of
our formsof representation, and so if homogeneity is one of those
conditions, then sense impressions must be homogeneous.25
Sellars’s mistake, if he made one, was not in assuming that
sense impressions were intrinsically conscious or that we are in-
fallible with respect to our mental states. As we noted, those
would be egregious mistakes for Sellars of all people to make
indeed. Rather, we can understand Sellars’s claim that sense
impressions must be homogeneous as proceeding in two stages.
Theﬁrst consists of the generalizedversionofRosenthal’s bound-
ary argument. In order to represent the arbitrarily-selected parts
of any object of representation, we must represent that object as
having some sensible quality. Since, however, those parts are
arbitrarily-selected, we must represent all of the parts of the ob-
ject as having some sensible quality. Thus, we must represent
objects as being homogeneous with respect to some sensible
quality. The second stage of the argument consists of a defense
of the claim that if representing an object as having some prop-
erty is a necessary condition of representing objects at all, then
that property is an intrinsic property of all objects. Those two
theses combined, would earn Sellars his conclusion that sense
impressions are necessarily homogeneous.26
the way they actual are is itself a distinction made from within our form of
representation, and so is itself subject to the necessary conditions of that form.
25Or as Kant (1781/1787, A277/B233) might rather rudely put it, “If the
complaints that ‘we have no insight whatsoever into the intrinsic nature of
things’ are supposed to mean that we cannot grasp by pure understanding
what the things which appear to us may be in themselves, they are completely
unreasonable and stupid. They want us to be able to be acquainted with
things without senses, consequently they would have it that we have a faculty
of cognition entirely distinct from the human.”
26Objection: if it is a necessary condition of representing objects that we
represent them as homogeneous, then could we not skip over all the wran-
gling over sense impressions and reject out of hand the scientiﬁc-image rep-
resentation of the world as consisting of particulate matter? Answer: while
conceiving of the physical world as consisting of absolute processesmight help
avoid having to deal with the epiphenomenal form detailed in the next section,
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Dialectically speaking, then, the generalized version of Rosen-
thal’s boundary argument relieves the pressure on Sellars’s ho-
mogeneity theses. At the same time, that pressure is distinctly
relocated to his and Kant’s claims about the nature of transcen-
dental philosophy. Now, some might see that dialectical shift as
so much the worse for Sellars insofar as the latter claims appear
signiﬁcantly less plausible than the homogeneity theses! That
discussion, however, is best left for another occasion. The point
here is merely that Sellars’s homogeneity theses are neither un-
supported dogmatism (as Hooker and McGilvray understand
them) nor the result of a glaring error that undermines much of
his own philosophical system (as Rosenthal understands them).
Rather, they are the conclusions of a piece of transcendental
philosophy that reﬂects the necessary conditions of our human
form of representation, which transcendental philosophy can be
reasonably challenged and defended in its own right. With at
least that much dialectic progress now made, we can return to
the Carus Lectures to pick up the argumentative thread where
we previously left it behind: with the rejection of Reductive Ma-
terialism.
6. Epiphenomenal form
Having thus dismissed Reductive Materialism, Sellars turns his
attention to what he sees as the three other possible forms of
position for accounting for the relation between the “states” of
the perceiver, which involve the somehow existence of color,
what prompts the relocation of color from a property of physical objects to a
property of experiencing subjects is not ﬁrst and foremost the incompatibility
of homogeneous sense impressions with particulate matter. Rather, it is the
sense impression inference, i.e., a need to explain our conceptual responses
to worldly stimuli. So, even if we had conceived the world as consisting of
absolute processes, we would still have to wrangle with sense impressions,
and ultimately Sellars’s sensa, although that wrangling would have been less
tortuous.
and the perceiver itself. All three of these possible positions—
Substantial Dualism, Emergent or Wholistic Materialism, and
Epiphenomenalism—embody what Sellars will call the epiphe-
nomenalist form, and the easiest way to present Sellars’s framing
of these three positions will be to in terms of that form. So, here
is Sellars doing just that for the ﬁrst of these two accounts.
ψi ψi ψi
↑ ↑ ↑
⇒ ϕi ⇒ ϕi ⇒ ϕi
For the substantial dualist, the ‘ϕ’s would represent states of the
CNS [central nervous system], the ‘ψ’s would represent states of
the sensorium. For the wholistic materialist, the ‘ϕ’s would rep-
resent physical-2 states of the CNS; the ‘ψ’s proper sensible states
(physical, but not physical-2) of the CNS. The diagram is the same;
only the ontology is diﬀerent. (Sellars 1981c, 84)27
Recall that all three of these accounts are aimed at explaining
what the relation is between a “state” of an experience sub-
ject and that subject itself in the face of the fact that the ex-
periencing subject consists of nothing other than a complex of
colorless micro-physical particles whereas the state constitutes
the somehow existence of color. I.e., the goal of these accounts
is to articulate what states and perceivers are such that color
can exist as a state of a colorless perceiver. Substance Dualism
answers that challenge by casting the color state as being, not
a state of the physical complex of the perceiver at all, but as a
state of a non-physical substance (Sellars 1981c, 78). Emergent or
Wholistic Materialism rejects the postulation of a non-physical
substance, and instead casts color-states as “emergent” states,
correlated with but not reducible to, the complex physical sys-
tem that it continues to take the perceiver to be (Sellars 1981c,
80–81). Epiphenomenalism, as Sellars presents it, is distinct from
both of these positions insofar as it proposes yet another recate-
gorization of our concept of color, this time from that of a state of
27More on what Sellars means by ‘physical-2’ below.
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the perceiving subject to the concept of a non-physical particular
in its own right (Sellars 1981c, 80–81).
As Sellars understands them, each of these accounts can be
pictured by the diagram above insofar as they agree in taking
the complex physical states of the perceiving subject (the ϕs) to
be governed by natural laws that are articulable entirely inde-
pendently of the color-states (the ψs), however we conceive of
them, that correlate with them.
The idea is that the occurrence of a ϕ-state is adequately explained
by the occurrence of another, preceding ϕ-state, no reference to the
associated ψ-object being necessary. Thus the only nomologicals
to which (in principle) appeal need bemade are laws formulated in
terms of ϕ-states. . . . from the standpoint of explanation, the basic
role is being played by the ϕ-states. For, (a) the ϕ-state laws are
autonomous, i.e., standon their own feet; (b) theψ-object sequences
are themselves explained in terms of ϕ-state laws and ϕ–ψ laws of
supervenience. (Sellars 1981c, 83)
To explain the behavior of the subject qua complex physical sys-
tem, one need appeal to only physical laws. The color-states
of the perceiver are then correlated with certain physical states,
but stand over and above them, neither causing any subsequent
changes in the physical states, nor themselves explainable in
terms of those states. Substance Dualism posits an entirely dis-
tinct non-physical substance that runs its course alongside the
physical world, but never interactswith it. Color-states are states
of that substance. Epiphenomenalism casts colors states as a
system of non-physical particulars, thus eliminating the need
for an account of the metaphysics of “states”, but likewise casts
the behavior these particulars as mysteriously correlating with
the behavior of physical particulars, although never interacting
with them. Finally, Emergent or Wholistic Materialism denies
that there are any substances or particulars that exist other than
physical ones, and so casts color-states as correlated with, but
irreducible to physical states. The cost there is leaving the meta-
physical relation of states to the substances of which they are
states similarly mysterious. Natural laws govern the behavior of
the physical particles; color-states correlate to complex arrange-
ments of these particles, but nothing more can be said regarding
in what this correlation consists or why it occurs.
Of course, it is precisely such mysterious correlations that Sel-
lars takes to be the downfall of each of these accounts. The very
purpose of these accounts was supposed to be to explain the rela-
tion between color-states and the perceiving subject. In all three
cases, this relation is reiﬁed, but not explained at all. As Sellars
sees it, this is no accident. The root of the problem here is the
category dualism that Jones ﬁrst initiates. Themetaphysical schism
between states and substancesmakes it in-principle impossible to
formulate a causally-closed and explanatorily-complete account
of our experience of the world. What is necessary to achieve that
end (of both science and philosophy) is a return to a categorially
monistic account of color experience. Thus does Sellars propose
an ontology of absolute processes.
To evaluate that proposal, we can begin with a word about
what it means to adopt an ontology of absolute processes. We
earlier noted that Sellars conceives of what look to be object-level
names of distinct metaphysical kinds (e.g., substance, property)
as actually functioning asmeta-level conceptual sortals (singular
terms, predicates). The same is true of absolute processes.
Broad introduces the concept of what he calls ‘absolute processes—
which might also be called subjectless (or objectless) events. These
are processes, the occurrence of which is, in the ﬁrst instance, ex-
pressed by sentences like ‘it is raining,’ ‘it is thundering,’ ‘it is
lightening’, i.e., which either do not have logical subjects or which
have dummy logical subject ldotswhich do not have the form
S Vs, e.g., Socrates runs
nor can plausible paraphrases which have genuine logical subjects
be found. (Sellars 1981b, 48)
An absolute process is the object-level reﬂection of a meta-level
conceptual sortal that includes in its scope those object-level sen-
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tences that either have no subject, or have only a dummy subject.
‘It is raining’ is the paradigm example. Thus, just as a world that
is pictured (in the Sellarsian way) by subject-predicate sentences
is thereby pictured as consisting of distinct objects (named by
subject terms) standing in nomological relations to one another
(corresponding to the inferential relations licensed by predicate
terms; see Sellars 1948), so theworld that is pictured by sentences
with no logical subjects is thereby pictured as a world without
objects, as consisting of only the temporal unfolding of absolute
processes.
Supposing that makes some sense, the next thing to notice
about Sellars’s proposal is that if all that the move to a process
ontology achievedwas to cast color-states as processes, that alone
would just get us back to the epiphenomenalist form.
Sensorium processes ψi ψi ψi
↑ ↑ ↑
Material bodies ⇒ ϕi ⇒ ϕi ⇒ ϕi
That picture would still demand an explanation of how senso-
rium processes relate to material body processes, and while the
prospects for such an explanation might look a little less dim,
the work of providing that explanation would still be a good
way oﬀ,28 and not much real ground will have been gained over
the accounts just considered. The real beneﬁt of adopting an
ontology of absolute processes as Sellars sees it stems from the
capacity of that ontology to conceive of both physical and sen-
sory states as being logical constructions of, or mere limitations
on, pure processes.
28In fact, it worth noting that even as he conceives of the prospects for
his proposal as a little more robust than this, Sellars only understands that
proposal as a widening of the conceptual space in which science can do the
diﬃcult work of actually depicting the nomological relations among sensory
and physical processes. As Sellars understands his proposal, it consists in the
presentation of a new and exciting categorial form, that can be used to shape
new content provided by future science.
Important terminological note before continuing: Sellars dis-
tinguishes between physical1 and physical2 states (and objects,
processes, etc.). Roughly, a physical1 state is any state that is part
of the causal structure of the world, whereas a physical2 state is
a physical1 state and is also the kind of state that could exist
independently of the existence of sensory states. So, all of the
states in which a rock or and tree can be are (presumably) both
physical1 and physical2. Perceiving subjects, on the other hand,
can be in both physical2 as well as merely physical1 states. I.e.,
perceiving subjects can be in states that are part of the causal
structure of the world (physical1) but are not “merely” material
(physical2).
With that idiom duly noted, here is Sellars presenting the
aforementioned explanatory advantage that accrues to his on-
tology of absolute processes.
If the particles of microphysics are patterns of actual and coun-
terfactual ϕ2-ings, then the categorial (indeed, transcendental) du-
alism which gives aid and comfort to epiphenomenalism simply
vanishes.
And once this picture has gone, they would be in a position to real-
ize that the idea that basic ‘psycho-physical’ laws have an epiphe-
nomenalist form is a speculative scientiﬁc hypotheseswhich largely
rests on metaphyscial considerations of the kinds we have been ex-
ploring. (Sellars 1981c, 86)
Here we see important aspects of Sellars’s Kant-style scientiﬁc
realism at play. What he envisions for an ontology of absolute
processes is explaining the appearance of a distinction between
micro-physical particles and their color-states via an appeal to
the underlying reality of absolute processes. What is crucial here
is that, as Sellars sees it, the epiphenomenanlist form has proven
itself untenable. His survey of the kinds of answers that are pos-
sible to the question posed by that form—what is the relation
of a substance to its states?—has revealed that no such answers
can succeed. Thus, the epiphenomenalist form itself must be re-
jected. It cannot be rejected simpliciter, though, because of the
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obvious reality of the somehow existence of color (or more gen-
erally the somehow existence of some homogeneous qualitative
feature of experience) that we saw Sellars defend in the previous
sections. What needs to happen, therefore, is that the epiphe-
nomenalist form must be explained as being the manifestation of
some underlying real ontology. There must be some way that
the world really is such that it manifests itself as appearing to
consist of substances and their states.
Of course, this is where absolute processes come in. Both
micro-physical particles and color-states will be cast as the
(merely apparent) manifestation of some underlying feature of
absolute processes. For example, just as one can understand a
mathematical point as a vanishingly small limit on a more on-
tologically fundamental line, one can understand a particle as
an analogous limit on more ontologically fundamental process.
Additionally, if one similarly conceives of a state as a limit on
some process as well, then the need to account for the relation
between substances and their states vanishes, because both will
be cast as features of a single ontological kind: the process.
Furthermore, as Sellars understands this explanation, because
they are of a single ontological kind, there is nothing prohibiting
understanding the processes that manifest as particles and the
processes that manifest as states as interacting causally or as
forming parts of a single whole.29
Nor does it require that neuro-physiological objects which have ϕ2-
ings as constituents, have onlyϕ2-ings as constituents. σ-ings could
in a legitimate sense be constituents of neuro physiological objects.
That is to say, whereas the objects of contemporary neuro-
physiological theory are taken to consist of neurons, which consist
of molecules, which consist of quarks, . . . —all physical2 objects—
29It is worth noting that Sellars takes the adoption of an ontology of absolute
processes to carry with it a new understanding of causality. As he puts it, it
requires abandoning the paradigmof “impact causation” (presumably because
there will no longer be particles to impact one another, but rather merely
processes unfolding in law-governed ways).
an ideal successor theory formulated in terms of absolute processes
(both ϕ2-ings and σ-ings) might so constitute certain of its ‘objects’
(e.g., neurons in the visual cortex) that they had σ-ings as ingredi-
ents, diﬀering in this respect from purely physical2 structures.
(Sellars 1981c, 86)
With this we have arrived at Sellars’s prospectus for a ﬁnal an-
swer to the question of what the place of color in the scheme of
things is. Both micro-physical particles and color-states are ac-
tually manifestations of absolute processes. Perceiving subjects
consist of processes that manifest as both particles and color-
states. When we originally conceived of colors as part of the
substance of the world, we were mislocating a part of ourselves.
We got this much right in casting color as a state of the per-
ceiving subject, but as the scientiﬁc image of ourselves revealed,
“state” ended up being a mere placeholder category awaiting
further explication. That placeholder lead to the various forms
of epiphenomenalism, none of which could make genuine sense
of the relation between a state and a substance. Thus, that form
must be mere appearance, and so we needed a picture of the
underlying reality that could explain it. Colors, like everything
else, are absolute processes. Unlike many other things, though,
they are absolute processes that, while part of the causal struc-
ture of the world, are not “mere matter”. They are essentially
mental phenomena: sensa, as Sellars calls them.30
That is a long and winding path with plenty of places along
the way for one to pause for hesitation and contemplation, or
to step oﬀ entirely. My hope is not to have convinced anyone of
Sellars’s ﬁnal position, but only to make a little bit clearer the
support that he marshals in support of it. The boundary argu-
ment shows that homogeneity is a necessary feature of any object
30Here we must keep a careful eye on the distinction that Sellars draws
between the mind-body problem and the sensorium-body problem. In that
context, ‘mind’ refers to speciﬁcally conceptual thinking, as opposed to the
mere sensings that are the non-conceptual, phenomenological constituents of
thinkings that are also ostensible percievings.
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of possible experience. Sellars’s transcendental realism implies
that attempts to draw a contrast between homogeneity objects
and non-homogenous ones will therefore be impossible. Thus,
homogeneity is necessarily both an original feature of our repre-
sentations of manifest-image objects and a feature that must be
preserved through any categorial transformation of those rep-
resentations. Since Reductive Materialism attempts to represent
theworld as particulate, and therefore non-homogeneous, it is an
untenable account of color. The extant alternatives to Reductive
Materialism, however, ultimately fare no better. Once we recon-
ceive of color from being an objective feature of objects to a state
of the experiencing subject,wewill inevitablybe forced to answer
the question of what the relation is between such states and the
substances that have them. For all the ways that we might try to
ﬁnesse this tension, as Sellars sees it, the only plausible answer
to this question will require a ﬁnal categorial transformation:
from this dualism of ontological kinds to an ontological monism
of homogeneous absolute processes. Sensa are distinctly men-
tal absolute processes that exist alongside and causally interact
with other, physical2 processes that manifest themselves as the
more familiar particles of micro-physics. As Sellars sees it, the
prejudice against such entirely mental phenomena is the result
of some combination of failure to understand the fundamental
problems of the epiphenomenalist form, failure to acknowledge
the undeniable reality of color, and simple bias in favor of a
purely physical2 mechanistic understanding of the world.
David Landy
San Francisco State University
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